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ARTICLE
IP TRANSACTIONS:
ON THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION
F. Scott Kieff *
ABSTRACT
All too often within organizations and communities,
innovations are not generated or put to use as rapidly or as
broadly as they could be. Chief targets for blame include the
problems of transaction costs, agency costs, lack of coordination,
and improper incentives. Borrowing from the rich literature in
the field generally known as new institutional economics, which
has studied these types of problems more broadly, this Article
elucidates how some practical tools might be expected to mitigate
such problems. Particular arrangements of formal law and
informal practice may help reach across the “valley of death”
between early stage technologies and their downstream
commercial deployment. Depending on the circumstances of a
given situation, different practices and different aspects of the
legal regimes of intellectual property, antitrust, business
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associations, bankruptcy, property, and contract may prove most
helpful. Elucidating at least as many questions for further
empirical research as answers in the form of practical tips for
structuring transactions, this Article focuses on the particular
mechanisms by which the problems and proposed solutions might
actually operate.
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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers and other professionals may be seen as some of the
giant transaction costs, or potential wastes, of modern society.1
Yet, in other respects, to the extent the underlying transactions
themselves are good for society and to the extent lawyers
facilitate those transactions, a positive view of lawyers is
appropriate, championing their role as “transaction cost
engineers.”2

1. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in
Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 62–63 (1982) (noting that there are “two
important elements of transaction costs in the acquisition setting: information costs
necessary to identify the opportunity; and mechanical costs—for example, lawyers’,
accountants’, and investment bankers’ fees—necessary to effect the transaction and cope
with regulatory or other barriers (including defensive tactics by the target)”).
2. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing lawyers as “transaction cost
engineers”); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 58 (2000)
(borrowing Ronald Gilson’s phrase “‘transaction cost engineers’” to describe lawyers); Troy
A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S.
Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1110–12 & n.190 (2004)
(examining Ronald Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost
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Recognizing that a lawyer’s real impact depends on the
circumstances of a given situation, this Article focuses on the
mechanisms by which particular types of transactions relating to
intellectual property can be structured to best facilitate
innovation and commercialization and explores both particular
3
practice tips as well as topics ripe for empirical research.
Touching on aspects of various legal institutions including
intellectual property (IP), antitrust, business associations,
bankruptcy, property, and contract, the Article proceeds as
follows. Part II provides an overview of New Institutional
Economics (NIE), the field of economics that studies the ways
institutions impact economic performance in general. Part III
provides a brief discussion of a role suggested by NIE for IP
institutions in general and patent law in particular. Part IV
explores some representative examples of transactions relating to
IP for which insights from NIE can suggest both specific practice
tools as well as topics for further empirical research. The Article
considers particular transactional issues relating to one example
from what may be seen as each phase of the commercialization
business life cycle: start-ups, innovating within a hierarchy,
deploying research tool innovations, and bankruptcy. Part V
concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NIE APPROACH
NIE emphasizes the use of comparative institutional
analyses to look at the different characteristics of institutions
and what impact they have on individuals and organizations over
time.4 The comparative institutional analysis approach of NIE
engineer); see also Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost
Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 241–44 & n.15 (1995) (exploring Gilson’s analytical
framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and, in addition to Gilson, citing
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A
Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 562 (1989) (“The Silicon Valley lawyer not only
works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer—a legal engineer. . . .
[H]is job is to solve problems: to take a principle, a task and ‘engineer’ it legally . . . .”));
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1911, 1923 (1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers, “savvy investors and
issuers” also help facilitate transactions).
3. The view offered here is rather optimistic about the role lawyers can play,
although it is admittedly written from the perspective of one who is at least doubly biased
on that point, as one who teaches lawyers and practiced law for several years.
4. The NIE approach treats as “institutions” the set of human imposed
constraints—such as formal laws and rules and informal norms—and their enforcement
characteristics. See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Nobel
Lecture at Washington University (Dec. 9, 1993), in ECONOMIC SCIENCES 1991-1995, at
112–13 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997), available at http://www.nobel.se/economics/
laureates/1993/north-lecture.html (providing an overview of the field that is accessible to
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teaches us to ask not only what we want, but also which mix of
formal and informal institutions will work better in achieving our
set of goals.5
A core lesson of NIE is that even when there is consensus
about what the goals of a particular institution should be, the
particular choices that are made about the details of the
institutional framework will have different and important
implications for a number of problems operating on a number of
levels. On the individual level, these problems include, inter alia,
those of incentives, rent dissipation, information costs, and
behavioralism. On the interpersonal level, these problems
include, inter alia, those of transaction costs, agency costs,
coordination, and private ordering. On the institutional level,
these problems include, inter alia, enforceability of laws and
norms, market failures, the differences between dynamic and
static efficiency or between ex ante and ex post considerations,
monopoly effects, government failures, and public choice, as well
as public goods problems and the tragedies of the commons and
anticommons.6
Because different institutional choices will have diverse
implications—positive and negative—for these varied problems,
NIE teaches why it makes sense as a conceptual matter to pay
attention to means as well as ends. Engaging in a comparative
institutional analysis makes conceptual sense because the perfect
institution, like the perfect anything, is simply not achievable,
and every real institution will have some problems. Accordingly,
institutional choices should not be about a singular search for
perfection but rather about which sets of problems and benefits

a general audience); see also MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 3–5 (2001) (applying game theory to comparative institutional analysis and NIE
to develop a deeper understanding of economic institutions); EIRIK G. FURUBOTN &
RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 6–7 (1997) (reviewing the concept of the institution and
generally defining it to mean “a set of formal and informal rules, including their
enforcement arrangements”).
5. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 7, 18–19 (discussing the importance
of both formal and informal institutions).
6. While these problems are grouped for presentation purposes here by the level at
which they are most evident, and with the recognition that in some respect these
groupings are inevitably imperfect, most of these problems can be seen to operate on more
than one level. For a short and accessible overview of these various problems in the
context of NIE, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions of Governance, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 75 (1998) and Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000) (addressing the different levels of
“social analysis”). See also FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 2–7, 122 (noting the
“role of individual decision makers” and expounding on the various problems encountered
at both the individual and institutional level).
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are best suited to tolerances and needs. Put differently, it is
better to compare the particular costs and benefits of actually
available options than merely to identify problems with one
option and seek to perfect it. This is a theory of the “secondbest.”7 The search for perfection is what Demsetz calls the
“nirvana” fallacy,8 and as Voltaire noted, it is through such
9
searches that “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” This is not
to say that institutions, existing or otherwise, should not be
studied critically or that everything should be left alone because
such complacency ignores the countervailing sage warning by
John Dewey that “‘the better is too often the enemy of the still
better.’”10
Moreover, institutions are essentially endogenous in that we
can change them if we want.11 Therefore, a comparative
institutional analysis makes great sense as a practical matter as
well.12
The comparative institutional analysis of NIE teaches a
great deal about many institutions, including the institution of
property in general and IP in particular. The section that follows
7. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 459 (“The basic conclusion, then, is
that it is inappropriate to focus attention exclusively on hypothetical or ‘ideal’
solutions. . . . The implication is, of course, that relative to the idealized neoclassical
benchmark all real-world situations can be no more tha[n] second best.”).
8. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor of a comparative
institution approach).
9. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., 4th
ed. 1996) (translating the saying “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien” as meaning “[t]he best is
the enemy of the good” and attributing the saying to Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique
(1770 ed.)).
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 315 (1992) (“To the
economists’ plea that ‘the perfect is the enemy of the good,’ we might oppose Dewey’s
suggestion that ‘the better is too often the enemy of the still better.’” (quoting 2 THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 652 (John J. McDermott ed., 1973)).
11. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining that an individual’s
self-interest can affect the functionality of institutions and that “endogenization of
institutions is . . . crucial to” NIE). The term “we” is used here in its broadest sense to
refer to all people in general. However, even groups of people are often unable to
effectively get particular government agencies or other institutions to fully incorporate
their views. Indeed, this is one of the problems explored in NIE under the topic of “public
choice.”
12. Some institutions are harder to change than others. For example, rewriting
statutes may not change the behavior of courts nor have the desired effect on norms. In
the end, the best mix of institutions may depend in part on the institutions that are
presently at play. Put differently, path dependency may also be relevant to the
comparative institutional analysis. In addition, the field of NIE extends far into the realm
of political science, where the process of institutional change is well studied. See, e.g.,
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 23–24 (noting that any institution is susceptible
to change and explaining the importance in understanding the causes and consequences
of change).
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provides a brief overview of tips from NIE about an often
overlooked role that IP can play.
III. OVERVIEW OF NIE LESSONS FOR IP THEORY
The bulk of law and economics literature on U.S. IP regimes
focuses on a reward theory of patents, which is premised on a
view that the government should first provide targeted incentives
for specific, creative individuals to solve the public goods problem
associated with intellectual works and then step in to mitigate
the monopoly distortion and transaction costs associated with the
IP right to exclude.13 The concern driving this perspective is that
the subject matter protected by IP will be under-produced
because, as characterized by the “Arrow Information Paradox,” it
has “public good” qualities.14 Under this view, incentives to

13. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L.
REV. 465, 466 & n.1 (2004) (“The conventional theory of intellectual property rights posits
that such rights exist to stimulate the creation and distribution of intellectual goods.”
(citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“Intellectual property [rights are] fundamentally about
incentives to invent and create.”))). Although there are a number of incentive-based
theories for IP that are mentioned in the literature—including “incentive to invent,”
“incentive to disclose” or “teach,” “incentive to innovate,” and “incentive to design
around”—there are essentially three dominant theories today: (1) some version of the
“incentive to invent” and “disclose” theories treated together under the rubric of “reward”;
(2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory. See generally DONALD S.
CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN, & F. SCOTT
KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 70–90 (2d ed. 2001) (reviewing various incentive
theories for the patent system). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–46 (1989)
(offering a slightly different take on various incentive theories of the patent system); A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories Of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 273–89 (1996) (providing yet another slightly different take on
various incentive theories of the patent system). For recent reviews of the copyright
literature on incentive theories, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 554–70 (1996), which suggests that
incentives may draw efforts away from other productive activities. See generally Michael
Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
374580 (highlighting the opportunity cost issues discussed by Lunney as well as showing
how additional works on the margin may contribute little while at the same time causing
rent dissipation).
14. Kenneth Arrow described a paradox about information as follows: “its value for
the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect
acquired it without cost.” KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 152 (1974)
(discussing what has been called the “Arrow Information Paradox”). Certain goods in a
market are said to be “public goods” if they have two distinctive features—they are
nonrival and nonexclusive—that suggest they will tend to be under-produced, or not
produced at all because of what some call a “free rider” problem. U.S. CONGRESS, OFF. OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992).
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produce are provided through specific rewards for specific
creative work. For example, patents are offered as incentives to
invent. Importantly, the literature does not see rewards merely
as some kind of ancillary effect of IP; it sees rewards as IP’s
central goal.15 Further, under this view, the reward and its
recipient must be carefully regulated to mitigate monopoly
16
effects and transaction costs.
As summarized by Jack
Hirshleifer and John Riley when discussing patents, for example,
“[t]he central problem considered by modern analysts . . . has
been the conflict between the social goals of achieving efficient
use of information once produced versus providing ideal
motivation for production of information.”17 Glynn Lunney has
called this conflict or balance between incentive and access the
“incentive access paradigm.”18
Although the reward literature contributes much to our
understanding of IP, it has a number of serious limitations. One
perspective is to see these theories as focusing on the role of
government in providing both subsidy and regulation rather than
providing what often are more predictable and less invasive
forms of intervention, such as rulemaking and dispute resolution.
That is, the government is seen as needed to support potential
holders of IP and then to keep them in check.
Put simply, the reward theories may be viewed as premised
on a false perception of tension between incentives and access.
The inventive side of the paradigm is inapt because IP rights are
not and should not be offered to provide direct incentives to
invent or create. Similarly, the access side of the paradigm is also

Indeed, individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it,
in hopes of getting access as “free riders.” The inability to exclude free riders
distorts market signals and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of
resources to nonexclusive goods and underproduction of them, relative to socially
optimal quantities.
Id.; see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 43–52 (1971) (elucidating how small, defined groups are the most
likely to overcome the transaction costs and free-rider problems raised by public goods).
15. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5–6, 8 (1991) (“The patent offers
the incentive of the statutory right to exclude as a means for inducing creative activity.”).
16. Several types of regulatory responses to IP rights are generally justified by this
concern. Examples include, among others, liability rule treatment, misuse, and fair use.
17. J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information—
An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375, 1404 (1979) (citing Kenneth Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962), and Fritz
Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 461, 468
(David L. Sills ed., 1968)).
18. Lunney, supra note 13, at 485–86.
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inapt because by design IP rights are more successful than
rewards in facilitating access.
Several fatal problems plague the reward theories of
patents, which are premised on the concern that the subject
matter of IP will be under-produced because as a public good it
generates what some see as positive externalities for which
payment cannot easily be gathered. First, as pointed out recently
by Haddock, many such externalities turn out to be irrelevant
because they are inframarginal.19 In other words, rewards may
not be needed. Second, rewards may not be effective.20 Third,
government grants of rewards can be fraught with negative side
21
effects like rent seeking. Fourth, whether the reward is a patent
or cash, there are a host of difficulties in developing a theory of
just deserts as a basis for government allocation of any reward to
potential claimants.22 But the most important limitation of the
19. David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Internalities, Irrelevant Externalities, and
Irrelevant Anxieties 5–30 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 03-16, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=437221 (providing
examples and models of irrelevant externalities and citing James M. Buchanan & Wm.
Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 374 (1962)). Consider for example, the
pleasure a visually aesthetic garden brings to passersby who happen to see it, regardless
of whether they contributed to its upkeep, the keeper of the garden has clearly managed
to fund its creation and maintenance without reaping specific contributions from those
passersby. For other examples of such irrelevant positive externalities see Jeffrey I.
Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Interindustry R & D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and
Production in High-Tech Industries, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 429, 432–33 (1988), which
found that, in recent years, social rates of return significantly exceeded private rates of
return in five high-tech industries due to the benefit to other firms of research and
development spillovers.
20. This may be because the activity is only responsive to alternative inducements
such as self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, and reputation. See, e.g., Besen &
Raskind, supra note 15, at 6.
Another critical element in deciding how to strike the balance between
encouraging creativity and dissemination is the extent to which creative activity
responds to economic rewards. The less that innovation depends on the resources
invested and the potential economic rewards, the more limited is the case for
granting substantial rights to creators.
Id.
21. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (generally
discussing how competition among those individuals seeking government benefits can
cause society as a whole to invest more than those benefits are actually worth to society
as a whole); James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY
OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 7 (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon
Tullock eds., 1980) (same).
22. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 713–14, 714 n.77 (2001) (citing LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN
GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996)). As pointed
out when discussing the problem of two or more authors or inventors
[c]oncerning the distinction between acts and omissions, one might ask what
level of contribution is required on the part of a supervising faculty member for
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reward theories, for purposes of the discussion here, is that by
focusing on rewarding particular activities, these theories run
the risk of overlooking some important insights revealed by NIE
about the role property rights can play in facilitating
coordination.
In contrast to the reward theories of patents, the
commercialization theory sees patents as enforced by a property
rule to help facilitate commercialization of the invention, after it
has been made.23 The downstream commercialization requires
coordination among the many complementary users of the
patented
invention, including, inter alia,
developers,
manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers, and
marketers.24 Providing a focal point, or beacon,25 the publicly
recorded IP right helps each of these individuals find each
other,26 and then by cracking the Arrow Information Paradox27
otherwise facing them, facilitates negotiations among them.28 At
the same time, therefore, IP rights assist the creation and
maintenance of both diversity and socialization among
individuals within the market by providing the incentive and
co-authorship or co-inventorship. Is active advice required, or is passive
permission and non-interference sufficient where others would have refused to
allow or continue a project? Also consider how the rules of praise should evaluate
the problems presented by cases of mere thought, transferred intent, or
unreasonable hopes, any of which might nonetheless correlate with inventive
success. To what extent should originality, effort, genius, or utility drive our
decisions to allocate rewards?
Id. at 714 n.77 (citations omitted).
23. See id. at 710 (explaining how the “patent right to exclude competitors” aids in
bringing all the players together to “facilitate commercialization of the patented
invention”).
24. Id. at 708–12 (discussing these many players and their incentives to interact).
25. While he initially saw property rights as tools for internalizing externalities,
Demsetz’s more recent work has focused on the role of property rights in facilitating
coordination by serving this beacon function. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights II: The Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S653, S664–65 (2002) (claiming that specialization creates a need for
coordination, which is facilitated by a private property system).
26. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics
of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 99–100 (2003) (pointing out that
the publicly recorded patent documents help coordinate commercialization by giving
notice of the property right over which bargaining or avoidance can occur); cf. Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353, 1354 (1982) (proposing “that under a unified theory of servitudes, the only need for
public regulation, either judicial or legislative, is to provide notice by recordation of the
interests privately created”).
27. See supra note 14 (discussing Arrow’s paradox).
28. See Kieff, supra note 22, at 710 (discussing the importance of the patent right,
which encourages the “holder of the invention and the other players in this market to
come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate commercialization of the patented
invention”).
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means for coordination among these diverse individuals.29 In
addition, as elucidated by the registration component of the
commercialization theory, the positive law rules for determining
when a valid IP right may be obtained protect reasonable
investment-backed expectations (and thereby decrease the risk of
asset specific investments and opportunism) by making sure the
right to exclude does not block activities individuals otherwise
are doing or are about to do and by giving public notice of what is
protected.30 Additionally, these positive law rules for obtaining
patents do so with relatively low administrative and public choice
costs.31
The commercialization theory explores the comparative role
of property rights in IP as a tool for facilitating the
32
commercialization of the subject matter it protects. Under this
view, IP offers a type of middle ground among several alternative
institutional and organizational arrangements for facilitating
29. See John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector
in the American Economy, 1870-1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
GROWTH 95 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1986) (discussing the need
for the government to establish and enforce a property rights system in order to promote
productivity and lower costs of exchange within the context of a more general discussion
of the connection between transaction costs and the division of labor). The connection
between division of labor and transaction costs, including the inevitable limit that
transaction costs places on the extent of the division of labor, was articulated by Adam
Smith. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35 (1968) (“‘As it
is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of
this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the
extent of the market.’” (quoting Adam Smith)).
30. See Kieff, supra note 26, at 76–77 (pointing out that the prior art rules for
patents protect “investment-backed expectations of both the patentee and its
competitors . . . in ways that involve” low administrative costs and in ways that make
“sure that valid patents leave others free to do whatever they otherwise were doing”).
That is, the novelty rules prevent patents from issuing on what others already are doing
and the nonobviousness rules prevent patents from issuing on what others are about to
do. Id. In addition, the disclosure rules operate to facilitate subsequent private ordering
by giving public notice of the property rights. Id. at 99. More specifically, the patent
system operates using what is known as “‘peripheral claiming’—as distinct from ‘central
claiming’—in which the function of the patent claim is not to set forth the heart of the
protected subject matter but rather to set forth its outer bounds.” Id. at 109.
31. Id. at 76. Indeed, because patentees are the lowest cost processors of the
information needed to assess validity, information costs are mitigated when the property
owners themselves are given such strong incentives to make these determinations. Recent
empirical models suggest these incentives do work. As elucidated by Anderson and Hill,
this type of owner-driven system for establishing property rights tailor-made to the needs
of the owners is the best candidate for mitigating the rent-dissipation that otherwise can
accompany the establishment of property rights. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill,
Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 441, 443 (1983) (showing
how less centralization in the definition and enforcement of property rights helps to
improve efficiency by avoiding rent dissipation).
32. See Kieff, supra note 22, at 707–11 (describing the roles and risks of inventors,
capitalists, and other market players in bringing inventions to market).
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coordination among atomized individuals in the free market
without IP rights, families or other close-knit groups, the firm,
and the government. As a middle ground between a firm on one
hand and a set of atomized individuals interacting across an open
market on the other, property rights for IP can offer the
coordination benefits of the firm and the strong incentives benefit
of the market.33 At the same time, property rights for IP mitigate
the risks of asset specificity and opportunism that are associated
with full integration within a firm. Although integration within a
firm is generally seen as decreasing certain problems of asset
specificity and opportunism,34 property rights as an alternative to
a firm may decrease other asset specificity and opportunism
problems—for example, it can be easier for an inventor to walk
away from a patent license with a firm than also to have to
surrender a basic employment relationship with the firm.
Property rights for IP also avoid the weakening of incentives
associated with integration within a firm, and that can be
especially pernicious where innovation is concerned.35 In
addition, property rights for IP can avoid the public choice costs
of more substantial and direct government involvement by
avoiding the need for a direct reward. Property rights also allow
more open participation than families or other close-knit
groups.36 Given the availability of reasonably predictable
enforcement through civil litigation backed by government
courts, IP rights can facilitate private ordering through
coordination without the need for the additional formal hierarchy
associated with organizational structures of families, firms, or
government agencies.

33. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–96 (1937)
(elucidating tension in the theory of the firm between transaction-cost avoidance and
decreasing returns to management). Of course, property rights also offer some of the ill
effects of each as well, including for example, some of the transaction costs of atomized
individuals interacting across an open market.
34. See, e.g., Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup through Vertical Integration:
Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33, 34 (2000) (“The GM-Fisher case is . . . the most
widely cited example of vertical integration reducing problems of physical and human
asset specificity, and it serves as an empirical cornerstone for hold-up explanations of
unified ownership.”); see also R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General
Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15, 18–19, 21–27 (2000) (reviewing facts of the GM-Fisher
integration).
35. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 141–
42 (1985) (discussing the problem of weakened incentives within a firm and the particular
problem this poses for innovation).
36. See Stephen Haber, Introduction to CRONY CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
IN LATIN AMERICA, at xii, xvi (Stephen Haber ed., 2002) (arguing that while close knit
groups can bring the benefits of facilitating coordination, they also bring the costs of what
Haber calls “crony capitalism”).
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Importantly, for private ordering to take place, liability rule
treatment must be avoided. As recognized by Haddock,
McChesney, and Speigel, the threat of the potential onslaught of
“infringements induced by a liability rule will discourage
investments” in the subject matter covered by the IP right ex
37
ante, which will in turn diffuse the beacon effect otherwise
associated with the right.
What is more, the monopoly impact of patents is both
overstated and understated. Patented inventions face
38
competition from prior, present, and future technologies.
Furthermore, the ability to use price discrimination gives the
patentee a strong financial incentive to maintain output at
competitive levels, thereby avoiding the dead-weight loss
potentially caused by a property owner’s power over price.39
Indeed, the 1980 changes in positive patent law in the
biotechnology industry40 facilitated commercialization in that
industry precisely because its commercialization costs were
“characterized by a particularly large difference between average
cost and marginal cost.”41 The need for protection is especially
strong in such markets because commercialization costs
represent a significant component of average cost.42 Only in the
United States, and only after this shift in positive law, has the
private biotechnology sector included a constantly changing pool
of around 1400 small and medium-sized companies,43 in addition

37. Kieff, supra note 22, at 733 & n.150 (stating that “the imposition of a liability
rule may create a prisoner’s dilemma in which each player’s dominant strategy is to
infringe in order to garner more of the potential gains from exchange for himself” and
citing David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal
Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1990)).
38. Consider, for example, that aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, various steroids,
and selective COX-2 inhibitors are each alternative technologies for treating pain.
39. Kieff, supra note 22, at 727–32 (showing how the patent system’s facilitation of
tie-ins and other forms of price discrimination where technological and economic factors
alone might prevent price discrimination helps the patentee keep output at competitive
levels).
40. Id. at 725–26, 747 (discussing such changes as the ability to patent living
organisms and gene fragments).
41. Id. at 724–28, 747–48 (explaining that the average cost per unit of output
includes both a pro rata share of total fixed costs, like the costs of building a factory, and
marginal costs, which are the incremental costs of inputs like raw materials and labor
that are needed to make each unit of output).
42. Id. at 724–25, 747 (“According to the commercialization view . . . it is precisely
this combination of high initial commercialization costs and risks facing the first mover
and low marginal costs facing a second mover that makes the biotechnology industry a
particularly strong candidate for patent protection.”).
43. NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the Bedside: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 47 (2003),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-38.pdf (statement of Phyllis
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to those large firms (sometimes referred to as “big pharma”)44
that were present in the United States and abroad both before
and after the shift in positive law. Importantly, while access to
finance and technology has increased within the United States
and abroad during this same time, and while companies can be
incorporated in the United States but still do business abroad
and vice versa, this replenishing pool of market entrants is
associated closely only with the availability of patents in
biotechnology in the United States after 1980.45 In this regard,
patents are associated with increased competition, not decreased
competition. Put differently, not only do patents often fail to
confer monopoly-like power, they can also be important
antimonopoly weapons—their availability can serve as an
effective antimonopoly vaccine for a market.
Concerns in the reward literature about behavioralism
46
problems are also misstated. More specifically, in response to
concerns about behavioralism leading to failures in transactions
Gardner, Senior Associate Dean for Education and Student Affairs, Stanford University).
44. Id. at 49 (detailing the differences between the biotechnology industry and the
pharmaceutical industry).
45. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 700–
01 (2001) (noting “the [unique and] unmatched growth in the United States biotechnology
industry and research since 1980” due in large part to positive patent protection changes
made in 1980).
46. The term “behavioralism” refers to all of the ways in which human beings are
not perfectly rational in decisionmaking and instead are said to be only “boundedly
rational” in that they suffer, among others, cognitive biases and framing effects, and they
employ heuristics. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (stating that “buyers are
boundedly rational rather than fully rational descionmakers” and they only “take into
account a limited number of product attributes and ignore others” when making
purchasing decisions). Troy Paredes noted, “Explaining and understanding these
deviations from perfect rationality make up the core of [the field known as] behavioral law
and economics.” Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 444 n.125 (2003); see also
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476–78 (1998) (“The task of behavioral law and economics . . . is to explore the
implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law.”); cf. GARY S.
BECKER, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, in THE ESSENCE OF
BECKER 633, 650–51 (Ramón Febrero & Pedro S. Schwartz eds., 1995) (stating that “[t]he
rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified
approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from different social sciences,”
including law). See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051 (2000) (providing a “blueprint” for the “law-and-behavioral-science approach,” which
leads to a “more sophisticated understanding[] of both the ends of those governed by law
and the means by which they attempt their ends” by relying on the psychological and
sociocultural theories rather than just economics); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (commenting on the
behavioralism literature in general and in particular Jolls et al., supra).
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over IP rights, commentators have called for regulation of IP
rights through the imposition of liability rule treatment and
greater antitrust enforcement.47 To be sure, like all actors in the
real world, IP owners are not perfectly rational. That is, people
are only boundedly rational in that, among other things, they
suffer cognitive biases and framing effects, and they employ
heuristics. On the one hand, identification of behavioralism
concerns does suggest reasons to be skeptical about the ability of
individuals to actually achieve for themselves what is in their
own best interest; as a result, behavioralism has justified resort
to liability rules, regulation, immutable contract terms, et cetera.
On the other hand, the individuals the government uses to affect
these responses—legislators, regulators, and judges—are, of
course, human beings too, and so also will suffer the limits of
behavioralism.48 What is more, these government decisions will
be subject to the public choice problems discussed below.
At bottom for IP, the behavioralism limits of the market are
important costs to consider. To the extent the alternative to IP is
simply lack of IP, then the countervailing considerations are the
coordination benefits that the commercialization theory
highlights. But to the extent regulation of IP is the alternative,
then behavioralism limits for government actors associated with
the regulation are also important countervailing considerations.
Furthermore, to the extent the regulation will occur ex post, then
interference with ex ante incentives is an additional
countervailing consideration to letting behavioralism concerns
justify deviation from basic property treatment for IP. Finally, as
discussed more below, regulation brings with it the inevitable
costs of government, including the tollbooth and rent-dissipation
49
problems of agency capture, as well as the real concomitant
problems alternatively known as “permit thickets,” “License Raj,”
or “anticommons,” as discussed more fully below.50
Ironically, much of the recent literature advocating
enhanced regulation of IP rights is tied to reliance on

47. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 13, at 1048–72 (discussing the link between
relaxing assumptions about rationality for IP and the use of liability rules for IP); see also
Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) (pointing out costs of rationality
assumption).
48. See Paredes, supra note 46, at 434–44 (detailing countervailing behavioralism
problems for government actors).
49. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002) (defining “tollbooth” theory
within the context of other theories of public regulation).
50. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (defining these concepts).
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anticommons concerns,51 but such reliance is misplaced for
several reasons. In contrast to the real anticommons problem of
the postsocialist economy, where an anticommons is correctly
described, much of the private value that an IP owner obtains
from the IP right to exclude is the ability to openly trade
permission for use in exchange for money or other
consideration.52 The economic motivations associated with such
“residual claims” are precisely what mitigate anticommons
concerns.53 As Richard Epstein and Bruce Kuhlik have recently
pointed out in response to the perceived anticommons problem
relating to IP, the distinguishing feature of the anticommons in
the postsocialist economy is that the bureaucrats’ efforts to
openly trade their permission for personal gain are likely to
trigger various forms of criminal liability for graft, bribery, and
public corruption, among others.54 Indeed, even the potential for a
51. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998)
(initiating literature on anticommons for IP within the context of biotechnology).
52. The IP owner may either actively license the IP to someone else who will in turn
sell the subject matter protected by the IP, or the IP owner may sell the subject matter
protected by the IP, which would include an implied license to the IP for its buyers. See F.
Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125–28 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (explaining how patent rights
can operate for biomedical discoveries including DNA); Kieff, supra note 45 (same).
53. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 31, at 441–43 (using the term “residual
claimant” while exploring the related problem of rent dissipation during races for a
common prize); see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:
Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 12 (2000) (highlighting the concern that
the crux of the problem for both commons and anticommons relates to the ability of those
engaged in the group activity to coordinate with each other, and that all other things
being equal, the ability to coordinate is likely to be less the more the individuals have
noneconomic motivations other than those enjoyed by individuals already otherwise
within a close-knit community).
54. Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 4 (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ.,
Olin Working Paper No. 209, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536322 (“But
the state bureaucrat is not the owner of any asset whose value will remain unlocked
unless he brings it to market.”). Nevertheless, individual regulators have incentives to try
to extract such value, which explains the results of the empirical study of the public
choice “tollbooth” theory of regulation elucidated by Fred McChesney, Hernando de Soto,
and Andrei Shleifer, among others. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE
INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (June Abbott trans., 1989) (discussing
problems of corruption); JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD:
1975-1995, at 107–08 (1996) (providing a comparative study of the effects of reduced
economic freedom on economic growth); FRED S. MCCHESNEY, Introduction to MONEY FOR
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 1–3 (1997) (“Rent
extraction represents a conscious, welfare-maximizing strategy for politicians
personally.”); Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 49, at 3–4
(reporting empirical data showing existence and extent of the problem); Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (elucidating that politicians and bureaucrats use legislation,
regulation, and threats both to create rents and to extract them through campaign
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drive to suppress the subject matter protected by IP is mitigated
by the uncertainty that higher untapped value may lie in wait.55
Put simply, the resulting social value of IP rights is that they
encourage their owners to discover and market methods for
pushing towards full competitive use levels; thus, IP rights will
not create anticommons problems in biotechnology, software
technology, or even in more mundane technologies like nails and
screws.56
What is more, the reward literature on IP gets the concerns
about anticommons backwards. Not only are anticommons
problems for IP overstated, the response generated by these
concerns—liability rule treatment and regulation—are likely to
generate true anticommons problems. For example, the recent
trend by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of
Justice Antitrust Division to pursue actions against patentees on
so-called “upstream” technologies in the name of mitigating
problems of market power, transaction costs, and anticommons,
is actually evidence of agency capture problems from the public
choice literature that can only frustrate market entry and also
upset private ordering overall because, as all players in the
market realize over time, terms like “upstream” and
“downstream” are so relative that they simply may be synonyms
for “things to be bought” and “things to be sold” by any private
57
party able to gain the agency’s attention. Put simply, there is a
huge difference between the openly tradable nature of property
on the one hand and the pernicious permit thicket or License Raj
on the other hand.58 At bottom, residual claim, tradability,
contributions, votes, political favors, or even bribes).
55. See Kieff, supra note 22, at 726 (observing that commercialization risks and
potential for future development provides incentives to license broadly).
56. See Kieff, supra note 52, at 127 (emphasizing that property rights will result in
market participants bringing about the most efficient solution).
57. For an excellent and easily accessible review of such recent FTC activities, see
Stanley M. Gorinson et al., Federal Antitrust Enforcers Focus on Intellectual Property
Abuses, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. TODAY 38 (2003) (discussing Rambus and Unocal cases). For a
more detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the problem with these
actions, see F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of
Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (2004).
58. See Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism:
India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (defining “License Raj” as a system in which
centrally-appointed boards and agencies retain control over distribution of permits and
licenses); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?,
REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54, 55 (discussing permit thicket). These terms “permit
thicket” and “License Raj” are more apt synonyms for the definition of anticommons that
refers to the problem associated with hyper-proliferation of regulatory restrictions as
compared with the broader definition of anticommons that refers to hyper-proliferation of
property rights and that turns out not to be correct. For more on thicket-like problems of
permits, see Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L.
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enforceability, and private information are each reasons that IP
rights are successful in avoiding anticommons effects.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM NIE FOR IP PRACTICE AND
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The above account is offered only to provide, in a summary
fashion, some of the theoretical reasons why treating IP as a
property right protected by a property rule can facilitate the
commercialization of innovations. The discussion that follows
provides some representative examples of transactions relating
to IP where some lessons from NIE about this coordination effect
can suggest both specific practice tools and topics for further
empirical research. These examples relate to transactional issues
that arise in what may be seen as each phase of the
commercialization business life cycle: start-ups, innovating
within hierarchy, deploying research tool innovations, and
bankruptcy.
A. Start-ups
Innovation is often associated with entrepreneurs, or startup companies. Usually characterized by limited resources, small
size, and informal relationships among its participants, the startup business often faces a set of challenges relating to the
seemingly harsh formalities of the legal and business
environments. The singular drive to obtain financing, known as
venture capital59—either with an eye towards directly extracting
value from that capital infusion or with an eye towards using it
as a tool for facilitating further operation or development—
sometimes leads to decisions that do not adequately take into
account the importance of the legal and business relationships
being created.

REV. 407 (1995). This problem is not unique to the postsocialist economy and indeed is
nicely captured by a well known expression used in India after throwing off British rule,
also called “Raj,” where it was said that Raj had been replaced by License Raj in the form
of excessive and unpredictable requirements for permits and licenses from the many
branches of the central government in order to conduct many important business
activities. For more on the License Raj in India, see, for example, JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49–51 (1993) (discussing the system of
permits and licenses needed in India for both outside investment and for internal
economic development). See also Parikh & Weingast, supra, at 1608. See generally M.
Shahe Emran et al., After the “License Raj”: Economic Liberalization and Aggregate
Private Investment in India (Aug. 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=411080 (showing the
effects of liberalization on the economy of India).
59. See ERIC S. SIEGEL ET AL., THE ERNST & YOUNG BUSINESS PLAN GUIDE 22–25
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing an overview of the details of venture capital).
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An often expressed fear about the start-up sector of the
economy is that there exists a so-called “valley of death” between
the start-up businesses with innovations on the one hand and the
successful commercialization of their innovations on the other
60
hand. What is interesting from an NIE perspective, is that the
reason for this gap may be due more to institutions than to
resources or information. More particularly, although those
looking to obtain venture financing seem to offer attractive
innovations in large numbers, those looking to invest in
innovation seem to have large quantities of available resources,
and the members of these groups seem to be meeting and
interacting with each other, the rate of deals these two groups
are able to achieve with each other may nevertheless be
suboptimal.
A central problem may be that the legal and business
relationships surrounding the innovation may not be designed ex
ante with a sufficient eye towards the later stages of financing
and its concomitant changes in ownership and control that so
often have to occur. The problems may relate in some respects to
IP law, or patent law, as well as to corporate law and contract
law or more general problems of ownership and control.
Concerning IP law, the commercialization theory discussed
earlier shows how important it is to have IP subject matter
protected by a property right backed up by a property rule. It is
the credible threat of an injunction that allows IP to serve as a
coordination beacon around which all the potential
complementary users of the asset it protects can gather. Several
practical implications flow from this view, especially for the
start-up company.
At the outset, effective patent protection must be sought.
Two common pitfalls that must be avoided to ensure this result
are: (1) delay in filing the application, and (2) reliance on anemic
disclosures when filed.
Regarding timing, many countries treat any public use or
sale of subject matter that later is the subject of a patent
application as prior art that can destroy patentability of that
61
subject matter. In contrast, the U.S. patent system allows a one
year grace period under which public use or sale within one year

60. Darius Mahdjoubi, The Austin Information Industry: Across the Valley of Death
(Feb. 2004) (unpublished slide presentation), http://www.bootstrapaustin.org/resources/
Valley_of_Death.pdf.
61. See, e.g., JOSEPH STRAUS, GRACE PERIOD AND THE EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW 21–23 (2001) (analyzing European Patent Convention
novelty provisions).
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of filing may not count as prior art.62 A cash constrained start-up
eager to demonstrate or sell must be careful either to avoid
public use or sale before filing or be certain to file within one year
of any public use or sale.
An area of further inquiry therefore might be the impact of
the grace period on start-ups. More particularly, it may be
fruitful to explore the different mechanisms start-ups use to
determine how to best strike the balance between the need to
offer the invention for sale as a tool for raising financing and the
need to maintain secrecy to preserve patent rights, as well as the
consequences of these different approaches.
On the disclosure itself, an increasing number of Federal
Circuit invalidity decisions have turned not on issues of prior art,
but on issues of inadequate disclosure.63 Although preparing a
detailed disclosure can be significantly more expensive,64 the
penalty for insufficient disclosures may be a patent of zero value.
An area of further inquiry therefore might be the impact of
initial disclosures on patent value. Specifically, it may be fruitful
to explore the impact that initial costs for patent drafting and
filing have on issued patent claims.
Even assuming a meaningful patent application has been
filed in a timely fashion, it is essential to ensure that ownership
of the application and any issued patents are concentrated and
maintained in a single legal person (an actual life in being, or
legal person such as a corporation or trust). Fragmentation of
ownership poses a serious problem because it can create a
tragedy of the commons in which the failure of a single owner to
join in efforts to exclude potential infringers may lead to
nonenforcement.65
62. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d
1054, 1058, 1060–61 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that third party use may raise the statutory
bar of § 102(b)). Often described as a statutory bar to the patenting of inventions
publicized for more than a year, this provision operates to provide a one-year grace period
for publicity that will not bar patentability. The grace period first entered the U.S. patent
system in 1839 as a period of “grace” lasting two years. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat.
354 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 31). The period was shortened to one year in 1939. Act of Aug.
5, 1939, ch. 450, 53 Stat. 1212 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1934)). And it remains so in the
present system. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
63. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (holding the disclosure for the particular patent to be insufficient); see also
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment of invalidity for lack of sufficient disclosure).
64. See, e.g., Rick D. Nydegger, Practical and Legal Considerations in Drafting the
U.S. Patent Application, in ELECTRONIC AND COMPUTER PATENT LAW 333, 365 (1990)
(stating that a detailed patent disclosure can involve significant costs).
65. See Kieff, supra note 22, at 735 (citing ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY 1228–36 (2d ed. 1997)).
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Because the touchstone of ownership for patents in the first
instance is inventorship, assignments to a common single legal
person must be obtained from all inventors. Before these
assignments can be executed, each inventor must be identified.
But care must be taken in tracking down all inventors because,
as the statute makes clear, people may be joint inventors even
though they do not physically work on the invention together, or
work at the same time, or “make the same type or amount of
66
contribution.” And while the statute itself does not set forth the
minimum quality or quantity of contribution required for joint
inventorship, the Federal Circuit has stated that the test for
inventorship may be easier to satisfy than some would expect:
“[T]o be a joint inventor, an individual must make a contribution
to the conception of the claimed invention that is not
insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured
against the dimension of the full invention.”67 The Federal Circuit
further noted, “Conception exists when a definite and permanent
idea of an operative invention, including every feature of the
subject matter sought to be patented, is known.”68
A closely related problem to these patent law questions of
inventorship and ownership are the questions of corporate law
and contract law that often follow soon after the inventive entity
situates itself within the start-up enterprise. The traditional
notion associated with large publicly-traded corporations, that
69
there is a separation between ownership and control, is less
applicable to closely held corporations like start-ups. In close
corporations, the same individuals frequently are shareholders,
officers, and directors,70 which in turn means a decrease in
specialization among the corporate team. While venture
66.
67.
68.
69.

35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000).
Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69 (1932) (stating that for corporations, the gap
between ownership and control is a “logical outcome of corporate development”). The
efficiencies of the separation between ownership and control have long been recognized.
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259, 261–65 (1967) (stressing the efficiency of the specialization of function that
characterizes the corporate form—wherein shareholders specialize in bearing risk and
directors and officers specialize in managing the company).
70. See Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and
Differences, 11 AM. BANK. INST. L. REV. 367, 391 (2003) (stating that “there tends to be no
difference between management and equity in the small firm”). Further, creditors of
closely-held companies routinely contract around limited shareholder liability by
demanding that the corporation’s shareholders execute guarantees obligating them to
satisfy the corporation’s debts. Susan Kalinka, Shareholder Guarantees and Subchapter S
Basis: Investment in the Corporation, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 674 (1991).

(3) KIEFFC8

2005]

10/3/2005 2:52 PM

IP TRANSACTIONS

747

capitalists, of course, bring along the possibility of increased
capital to a start-up venture, what many entrepreneurs in a close
corporation seem to overlook is that these outsiders also bring—
either directly themselves or through networks with other
professionals—a vast amount of specialized skill and knowledge
associated with the management and operation of a business,
including expertise in phases of growth, economic markets, and
regulatory regimes.71 The rub here is that unless the initial
ownership and control norms and formal contractual
relationships and other business organizational documents of the
start-up are structured properly, start-ups may simply be ill
suited for outside investment.
An area of further inquiry, therefore, might be the
exploration of the exact nature and magnitude of the types of IP
ownership and control problems that seem to be at play in the
start-up sectors. For example, control might be too diffuse among
the founders, resulting in a collective action problem in deciding
how to approach venture financing. Or, control might be too
concentrated in a founder who has esoteric interests that make
venture sources wary of investing. For example, this control
entity might care less than potential investors about financial
return on investment. More pointedly, there may be a nontrivial
risk that the control entity will develop, at best, totally
orthogonal or, at worst, totally adverse interests to those of the
venture capitalists.72
Finally, a related set of patent law and contract law
problems of ownership and control arise as start-ups sometimes
seek to out-license technology to more developed partners.
Although it may initially seem that partnering with an
established developer or manufacturer will maximize technology
diffusion and absorption, that partner may shift agendas and lose
interest in ensuring the use of the subject matter protected by

71. See David Gerhardt, Two Views of Venture Capital: The Entrepreneur, TEX. BUS.
REV., Apr. 1999, at 4, 4 (noting that the best venture capitalists bring “business knowhow, industry expertise, and contacts” to their ventures).
72. This may be one of the reasons that some of the various government venture
entities like In-Q-Tel and DeVinCi may not have as high of a success rate in
commercialization as might have been hoped. It is difficult for these entities to bond
themselves against the intense risks of large shifts in government policy that might make
the entire business collapse. See Barry Ashby, Uncle Sam . . . Venture Capitalist, INDUS.
HEATING,
Mar.
2005,
available
at
http://www.industrialheating.com/CDA/
ArticleInformation/features/BNP__Features__Item/0,2832,146308,00.html
(suggesting
that government funds also involve conflicts of interest that lead to public policy making
and result in “redistribution of risks to the public and reduced returns to the private
investors”).
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the IP right.73 Although some might describe the scenario as
patent suppression, in which the patent right to exclude use
operates to prevent others from using while the licensee itself
elects not to use, the term suppression implies a state of mind
that may not always, or even often, be present. Yet, the problem
can be avoided with careful contracting, including milestone
requirements and the option to haul back technology and any
related IP ownership or license if the technology is not
sufficiently deployed.
An area of further inquiry, therefore, might be the
exploration of the frequency and mechanisms by which such
waste or suppression occurs, as well as the frequency of use and
enforcement of milestone, haul-back, and other workaround
clauses.
B. Innovating Within Hierarchies
Even after the start-up has been set up, it often must
continue to innovate. Yet, the more the business entity grows,
the greater the hierarchy and the greater the resulting problem,
long recognized in the NIE literature, of innovating within
hierarchies. Hierarchy is itself one of the core areas of study
within the field of NIE. More particularly, the contrast between
interactions among individuals through a market and
interactions among individuals within a hierarchy such as a firm
or government lies at the core of the early NIE literature by
Coase on the theory of the firm.74 On the one hand, moving
interactions within a hierarchy can avoid or mitigate many of
those transaction costs associated with exchanges in the context
of an open market.75 On the other hand, integration within a
hierarchy has limits because of the decreasing returns to
management due to several factors, including agency costs76 that
73. See Kieff, supra note 22, at 735 (noting that co-owners of a patent may lawfully
grant licenses to third parties without accounting to the other co-owners, which may at
least dilute the value of the patent overall and at most eliminate its value).
74. See generally Coase, supra note 33 (elucidating tension in the theory of the firm
between transaction costs avoidance and decreasing returns to management). See also
Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998) (“It is
commonly said, and it may be true, that the new institutional economics started with my
article ‘The Nature of the firm’ (1937) . . . .”).
75. See Coase, supra note 33, at 392 (“[T]he operation of a market costs something
and by forming an organi[z]ation and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct
the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”).
76. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). The
term “agency cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with the inevitable
divergences in the interests among two individuals in situations in which one individual
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involve the agency relationship between owners and managers
and the agency relationship between managers and labor.77
As demonstrated through models of both the private and
academic sectors, agency problems can be particularly acute
when the agent is tasked to innovate because the process of
innovation is itself particularly fraught with uncertainty and
because information about an innovator’s efforts is likely to be
especially asymmetrical as between a technologically trained
78
innovator and a nontechnologically trained manager. To be
sure, relational contracting, like that which occurs among
individuals within a hierarchy, is just one typical form of
incomplete contracting for which there are well-studied
strategies to mitigate agency costs.79 One example of particular
relevance to innovation would be the offering of stock options
whose value presumably increases with the future profits

(the agent) acts on behalf of the other (the principal). As summarized by Jensen and
Meckling:
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the
aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the
agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take
certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal
will be compensated if he does take such actions. . . . In most agency
relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and
bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be
some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would
maximize the welfare of the principal.
Id.
77. See generally FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 336–41 (discussing the
limits of integration elucidated by WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 138–40).
78. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 305 (1989) (modeling agency costs in innovation and identifying attributes that
make it comparatively more difficult as a production activity in which to solve ordinary
principal to agent problems compared to ordinary production processes because of greater
ex ante uncertainty and asymmetrical information about the innovator’s efforts); Wallace
E. Huffman & Richard E. Just, Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research:
Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 828 (2000) (applying
principal-agent theory to model different funding approaches for basic scientific research
in the field of agriculture).
79. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 164–68. Williamson notes the general
importance of repeat play, reputation effects, and other private enforcement techniques
he collectively calls “private ordering” as tools for mitigating problems such as agency
costs and asset specificity. See id. at 164–67. For an excellent review of specific techniques
corporations use to align incentives and remuneration with particular focus on their
impact on chief executive officers, see Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How
to Fix Them (Harvard Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 04-28, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
For an overview of the theoretical underpinnings for these techniques and the problems
they are designed to address, see George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives:
Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988).
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generated by a firm’s innovations. Yet, the general uncertainty of
allocating credit for innovation within a hierarchy combined with
the problem of potential expropriation by control groups of the
reward associated with innovation may operate synergistically to
particularly impair incentives for innovation within a hierarchy.80
The specific incentives facing a potential innovator within a
given hierarchy will likely vary across organizations and over
81
time. As a result, the precise impact of a given incentive may
not be predictable.
Because individuals have complex agendas, or preferences,
and only limited resources available to use in achieving the
diverse items on these agendas, they must, and do, make choices
about which agenda items to pursue before others. The
mechanisms by which individuals make choices have been
studied in a variety of settings, and as Gary Becker concludes in
his work extending economic analysis to new areas of human
behavior and relations, “no approach of comparable generality
has yet been developed that offers serious competition to rational
82
choice theory.” But regardless of whether people are perfectly
rational in making choices, they must and indeed do, make
agenda-priority choices, at least implicitly.83 That is, without
taking sides in the debate about whether rational choice theory
fully captures the behavioralism models or whether they are
appropriately considered somehow distinct, it is sufficient to
point out that consideration of incentives, agendas, and resources
does make sense because people really do consider them. As
Becker, borrowing an aphorism from George Bernard Shaw,
philosophized: “‘Economy is the art of making the most of life.’”84
A given individual’s agenda is likely to be complex and
might, for example, include the goals of accruing money, fame,

80. FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 4, at 336–38 (highlighting Williamson’s
discussion of the problems of “causal ambiguity” and “general office intrusion”
(expropriation) leading to impaired incentives to innovate).
81. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 140 (stating that incentives facing a
potential innovator will not be the same for every organization in every circumstance).
82. BECKER, supra note 46, at 650; see also Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank
(Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1992 (Oct. 13,
1992), http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1992/press.html [hereinafter Press
Release] (describing the achievements and life work of Gary Becker).
83. See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 46, at 1066–74 (describing the
limitations of rational choice theory, including its ineffectiveness at “yield[ing] a single,
unique behavioral prediction . . . [and] fail[ing] to eliminate many conceivable possible
actions”).
84. See GARY S. BECKER, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in THE
ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 46, at 3 (quoting George Bernard Shaw); Press Release,
supra note 82.
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relaxation, or other things. Such an individual will regularly
make decisions that effectively set priorities among these
different goals. As some items on the agenda appear to that
individual to be less likely to be achieved, the individual may
tend to shift focus or reprioritize towards other items on the
agenda. For instance, if it appears harder to obtain some
hypothetical goal A than hypothetical goal B, then investment in
achieving A relative to B may decrease.
At bottom, the complex interaction among agendas,
resources, information, and decisionmaking helps explain why
actual incentive effects may be different than hypothesized. For
example, paying potential inventors more per filed patent
application may not be needed and may even lead to perverse
incentives to file applications that are not worth their expense.
This may lead to a tendency to instead try to peg bonuses for
patents—either kudos or cash—to invention commercialization,
but this too has problems. First, the uncertainty and delay in
commercialization may substantially undercut its incentive
effect. Second, personhood and other connections to the invention
may provide sufficient bonding of interests. Put differently, the
fear of gaming and too many applications may push reward to a
later stage, but personhood concerns may dominate once an
application is filed, so rewards then may not be needed and may
trigger other costs. In the end, knowing the details of the
institutional parameters at the local level will be the key. And, of
course, a good manager can shape perception of both carrots
(positive incentives) and sticks (negative incentives) by being a
norm entrepreneur. One area for further empirical research on
this issue, therefore, is to explore the types of norm structures
and carrots and sticks that are found to work and not work for
promoting innovation within hierarchies.
C. Deploying Research Tool Innovations
A topic of particular concern in the literature is tied to the
problem of IP rights in basic research tools and their potential
impact on subsequent innovation. However, the theoretical
debates on this issue do not reveal the exact mechanisms by
which actual successful and failed attempted exchanges are
occurring.
Therefore, one area for further empirical research is to
uncover data about actual behaviors in a community to better
inform commentators, judges, and legislators about the role
patents are actually playing in that community so that specific
changes in laws and norms can be implemented where advisable.
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More specifically, one possible project could explore the objective
and subjective parameters involved when members of the basic
biological science community participate in attempted exchanges
of material or information. The data generated will help
policymakers shape laws, rules, and norms in order to best
facilitate these essential exchanges. As recognized by the 2002
report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development entitled “Genetic Inventions, Intellectual
Property Rights and Licensing Practices,” gathering this type of
empirical data is a high priority in the field.85
Empirical projects focusing on related areas have been
conducted, but while each has provided important information,
none has generated broad-based data on the precise mechanisms
associated with the actual attempted exchanges and the reasons
they succeeded or failed. For example, the recent project by
Walsh, Arora, and Cohen was based on a small sample set—only
“70 interviews with IP attorneys, business managers, and
scientists from 10 pharmaceutical firms and 15 biotech firms, as
well as university researchers and technology transfer officers
from 6 universities, patent lawyers, and government and trade
86
association personnel.” Additionally, the work by Hillgartner
and Brandt-Rauf has provided specific examples of failed
exchanges, which are essentially case studies.87 In another study,
a group of researchers conducted a large-scale survey that
focused on factors other than patents, including age, gender, and
prestige of the scientist’s host organization.88 While the foregoing
examples have provided important insights by focusing on
opinions, particular examples of failed exchanges, or the
importance of factors other than patents, a large-scale survey of
the actual way patents impact attempted exchanges remains to
be conducted.
The basic proposal offered here is to conduct a survey of
members of the basic biological science community designed to
85. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 83 (2002), http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf (listing this need for empirical data first among a set of
priorities).
86. John P. Walsh et al., Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical
Innovation 8 (Carnegie Mellon Heinz Sch., Working Paper No. 2003-2, 2002), http://www.
heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/retrievePDF?id=2003-2.
87. Stephen Hilgartner & Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Data Access, Ownership, and
Control: Toward Empirical Studies of Access Practices, 15 KNOWLEDGE 355, 359, 363–66
(1994) (discussing “data stream” theory of data sharing and barriers to data access in
academic research).
88. Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence From
a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002).
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generate different types of data about the objective and
subjective parameters involved when members of the biological
science community participate in exchanges of material or
information. One series of questions should be directed to
personal, but not private, characteristics of the individual
participants—such as gender, seniority, participation on peer
review and promotions committees, and views about how patents
can and should operate in this field. Another series of questions
should be directed to the characteristics of the host institutions
involved in the attempted exchanges—such as whether they are
commercial, educational, or governmental and whether they
receive funding from sources that are commercial, educational, or
governmental. The next series of questions should be directed to
the characteristics of the attempted exchanges themselves—such
as whether negotiations were conducted directly by the scientists
themselves, by administrative personnel, or by attorneys;
whether they were between individuals who participated in prior
exchanges or who expect to partake in future exchanges; whether
they were conducted in writing, via e-mail, by phone, or in
person; whether they were perceived as easy or difficult; and
whether they were based on form documents or generated during
negotiations. An additional series of questions should be directed
to the results and impact of the attempted exchanges—such as
whether the exchange was consummated and if it was, whether
consummation occurred in time to be helpful to the requester and
whether the requester retrospectively viewed the price paid as
too high; but if it was not consummated, whether
nonconsummation impacted the requester’s work, whether the
exchange failed because the requester viewed the price
demanded or hassle of negotiation as too high, and whether as a
result of the attempted exchange the participant is more or less
likely to initiate or respond to a subsequent request for exchange.
The data from this project will provide the first empirical
evidence about the frequency and mechanisms of exchange
failure and consummation relating to the use of patents in the
basic biological research community so as to provide essential
empirical evidence to help resolve the policy debate between
patent critic and patent proponent theories. If a high rate of
consummation is found, it will provide one reason why the
community has enjoyed such great success since 1980.89
Conversely, if a low rate of consummation is found, it may
suggest that such success could have been even greater, and that
89. See supra note 45 (noting the expansive growth of the U.S. biotechnology
community after 1980).
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the community might be expected to experience a lower rate of
success in the future when research will be building upon the
more foundational work from the period of initial development in
this relatively new field.
Perhaps more importantly, the data from this project will
provide the first empirical evidence about the different types of
market failures that might be occurring in the basic biological
science community. This is important because different types of
failure may suggest different policy responses.
Some failures that might be occurring may suggest the need
for the development of new institutional approaches. It may turn
out that the individual hassle costs of dealing meaningfully with
attempted exchange in each case are experienced by members of
the community in much the same way we all experience the
hassle costs of telemarketing for goods or services that actually
are better deals than those we are presently using, and yet we
rationally elect in each case to simply not reply. In such a case,
one appropriate policy response would be the establishment of a
new institution to facilitate exchanges using standardized terms,
like a clearing house analogous to the artist rights groups—the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Incorporated (BMI)—in the music
90
industry, or the Copyright Clearance Center’s on-line catalog for
permission to photocopy published texts.91
Other failures may suggest the need for legal reform. The
fear of liability for patent infringement could be keeping many
researchers from gaining access to needed materials and
techniques. One response to such concerns that has been adopted
in the regime of copyright law is to change patent law to permit a
92
form of research fair use or pro bono publico exemption.
A related concern may be that such perceptions about
liability, even under existing patent law, may be misinformed
because those who engage in activities without permission from
the patentee may not be suffering repercussions. That is, the
patentees may actually be granting what in effect is an implied
license for such activities.93 In such a case, some failures that
90. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7 n.18 (2000) (discussing artist rights
groups in the entertainment industry).
91. Copyright Clearance Center, http://www.copyright.com (last visited Oct. 2,
2005).
92. See Craig Joyce, “A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature”: Wheaton v.
Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325,
390 nn.296–97 (2005) (discussing noninfringing uses of copyrighted material).
93. See e.g., Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. Pag, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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might be occurring may be due to a misunderstanding among
members of the community about how patenting actually
operates. For example, some community members might be
seeking and enforcing patents that would not be viewed as
profitable to a rational, well-informed actor and some members
might be seeking express permission that might not be worth
obtaining to a rational, well-informed actor. In such cases, an
appropriate policy response would be the creation of new
educational programs about how individual members of the
community could get the most out of the patent system in a way
that also will provide net benefits for the community. For
example, some universities, such as the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, have developed patent acquisition and technology
transfer practices that tend to maintain the tightest private
control over the inventions that can be used most efficiently from
a societal point of view if subject to a single rights-holder.94 This
behavior is in the commercial self-interest of the individual
university because obtaining and enforcing patents in this area is
an extremely expensive and risky investment. Such behavior
offers a possible model of a new descriptive norm among
individual actors in the community acting rationally within their
own self-interest to maintain the tightest private control over
only those inventions that can be most efficiently utilized if
subject to a single rights-holder. Such a model also will avoid
frustration of the consensus set of abstract prescriptive norms.
The data generated by this project will provide the first
empirical evidence available for use in running established
economic models of exchanges among market actors, in general,
to evaluate how successful such attempted transactions actually
are when they occur among members of the basic biological
science community, in particular. These models teach that such
transactions are likely to fail when, all things considered, the
transaction costs themselves exceed the perceived potential gains
from the trade. This can occur in many situations, such as when
there are information asymmetries, cognitive biases, holdouts,
and other market failures. These models also teach that markets
that are thinner, in that they are less diverse and less wealthy,
tend to experience these market failures more often and with
greater negative impact than other markets. Therefore, this
(explaining that a “patentee grants an implied license to a purchaser when (1) the
patentee sells an article that has no noninfringing uses and (2) the circumstances of the
sale plainly indicate that the grant of a license should be inferred”).
94. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 144–46 (1999) (noting such practices are
efficient); id. at 110 (describing Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s licensing program).
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project can help policymakers use established techniques in other
fields to shape laws, rules, and norms so as to best facilitate
exchanges in the important field of basic biological research.
D. Bankruptcy
Although the topic of bankruptcy may seem rather gloomy,
especially so soon after the upbeat topic of start-ups, the reality
is that the threat of bankruptcy is omnipresent. Yet, the question
of control rights in bankruptcy is especially important when it
comes to IP:
Tangible assets generally retain their value both during
and after bankruptcy proceedings . . . . [But] IP is different.
IP rights are typically most valuable when they carry a
credible threat of injunction. However, as a result of the
delay and coordination problems inherent in the
bankruptcy system, a debtor’s IP rights may be underenforced against infringers . . . . Consequently, the
bankruptcy process itself potentially can eliminate all, or at
least a substantial portion, of the value of IP rights.
To ensure that a debtor’s IP rights are enforced
vigorously, a party with the right incentives, information,
and resources, as well as with standing to sue, needs
control over IP assets in bankruptcy. Some might suggest
that modern bankruptcy practice already has become, or is
increasingly becoming, sufficiently streamlined so that the
delay and coordination problems of the bankruptcy process
do not present serious concerns for the enforcement of IP
rights. However, the extent of the impact that such
procedural improvements might have on ensuring the value
95
of IP rights in bankruptcy is debatable.

In response to this concern, the practitioner might offer a
bankruptcy remote special purpose entity (“SPE”) to hold title to
IP assets in a move that is not unlike a typical asset
securitization.96
It is recognized that the creation of an IP-SPE imposes its
own risks and costs. For example, the transfer must be a true
sale, the costs of the transaction itself will not be trivial, and
control over the SPE must be agreed upon.
Therefore, one area for further empirical research on this
issue is to explore the types of IP-SPEs that are used and under
95. F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, An Approach to Intellectual Property,
Bankruptcy, and Corporate Control, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1313, 1315–16 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
96. See id. at 1316–17 (exploring IP-SPE within the context of bankruptcy).
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what circumstances they are used. Related empirical research
could also indicate the extent to which failure to rely on the IPSPE approach results in any real problem in the first place:
We recognize that more needs to be known about the
extent to which the problems discussed above are not only
problems in theory but problems that actually occur in the
real world. Informal observations of practitioners reveal
that while some lawyers and their clients spend substantial
resources structuring IP transactions around the types of
bankruptcy concerns described above, others do not. In
other words, even if the costs that bankruptcy poses for IP
are not large on the whole, they do exist and are thus
relevant to any consideration of the implications of
bankruptcy for IP assets. To gain a richer understanding of
the nature and extent of the problems bankruptcy poses for
IP, it would be worth studying empirically specific disputes
and transactions. For example, it would be helpful to
understand better the extent to which bankruptcy increases
infringement of debtors’ IP rights. Better information
regarding how often, and under what circumstances, a
debtor-in-possession or trustee-in-bankruptcy actually fails
to bring and aggressively pursue infringement actions also
would be useful. Relatedly, one could explore which
corporate constituencies of a debtor instigate the bringing
of infringement actions and how other constituencies react
when an infringement action is urged. In particular, it
would be useful to know more about the precise
mechanisms by which efforts to enforce or transact over an
IP asset that is part of a bankruptcy estate actually occur,
including how such efforts are mounted and by what
parties, how other constituencies respond and why, and
what specific factors influence how these efforts play out.
Further, it is important to have more systematic data
regarding how often the defenses of laches, estoppel, and
implied license are asserted by an alleged infringer against
an IP right that has been tied up as part of a debtor’s
bankruptcy estate and under what circumstances the
defenses are successful. Finally, one could collect data
concerning the extent to which parties shy away from
entering into licensing arrangements with a debtor in
bankruptcy or even with a company that is not yet
97
bankrupt but that is financially distressed.
In addition, it also would be interesting to determine “how
frequently, and under what circumstances, disputes arise over
whether the efforts of a debtor-in-possession or trustee-in97.

Id. at 1323–24 (footnotes omitted).
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bankruptcy to enforce or transact over IP rights falls within the
scope of the ordinary course of business.”98
V. CONCLUSION
How best to facilitate the processes by which ideas become
inventions and inventions become useful products or processes is
a question of importance to members of the government,
academic, and private sectors. These processes matter to all
those wishing to use technology, invest in it, trade in it, or benefit
from its overall impact on national economic development, on
international economic competitiveness, and on other
noneconomic public policy goals. Yet, many ideas fail to become
inventions as rapidly as possible, and many inventions fail to be
commercialized as broadly or as rapidly as possible. Put simply,
the generation and deployment of innovation within
organizations, markets, and communities too often fails to occur
at levels and timing we might prefer.
This Article explores how some particular arrangements of
formal law and informal practice may help reach across the
“valley of death” between early stage technologies and their
downstream commercial deployment. Recognizing that a lawyer’s
real impact of course depends on the circumstances of a given
situation, this Article focuses on the mechanisms by which
particular types of transactions relating to IP can be structured
to best facilitate commercialization of innovations. Recognizing
that in different situations, different circumstances may suggest
different approaches, particular practice tips and particular
topics ripe for empirical research are identified in a few
representative areas relating to innovation: start-ups, innovating
within hierarchy, deploying research tool innovations, and
bankruptcy. It is hoped the ideas explored here will help
practicing lawyers continue to best fulfill their role as transaction
cost engineers, while at the same time helping academics and
policymakers identify those areas where further empirical
research is needed.

98.

Id. at 1329 n.51.

